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The expansion of state-mandated tests in the 1990s and the testing requirements of the No 
Child Left Behind Act have supplied researchers with an abundance of data on test scores that 
can be used as measures of school quality. This paper uses the state-mandated test scores for 5
th 
grade and 11
th grade in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, to examine three issues about the 
capitalization of school quality into house prices: (1) At what level do prospective home buyers 
evaluate the quality of local public education—at the district level or the level of the 
neighborhood school? (2) After accounting for student achievement as reflected in test scores, 
are other aspects of the local public school system, such as class size or expenditures, capitalized 
into the value of a house? (3) Are the positive results we get for the capitalization of school 
quality into house prices due simply to the correlation between high test scores and other 
desirable neighborhood characteristics? The results of our investigation suggest that to home 
buyers some test-score averages are significantly better indicators of the quality of the local 
public school system than others. In particular, home buyers seem to evaluate the quality of 
public education at the district level rather than at the level of the local school. Class size at the 
high-school level has some independent effect on house prices, but not class size at the 
elementary school level. And once we account for student achievement, expenditures per pupil 
have no further effect on house prices. Finally, restricting our sample to similar neighborhoods 
along school district boundaries confirms our earlier results for high school test scores but not for 
elementary school scores.
  
Capitalization of the Quality of Local Public Schools: 
What Do Home Buyers Value? 
 
 
  In his 1956 article, Charles Tiebout first published his theory that consumers (home 
buyers) shop among local communities for the combination of local public goods and taxes that 
best satisfies their preferences. One implication of this theory is that, other things equal, houses 
in a community that offers a higher quality of public goods for the same level of taxes will 
command higher prices. Empirical tests of this implication of the Tiebout model have focused 
primarily on the capitalized value of local public education. Much of the early research centered 
on the proper measure of school quality and the appropriate functional form of the hedonic 
equation used to estimate the effect of school quality on house prices. More recent research has 
emphasized the need to control for the housing and neighborhood characteristics that are 
correlated with common measures of school quality such as test scores. And some papers have 
broadened the scope of the research to include not only the direct effect of school quality on 
house prices but also the indirect effect due to differences in neighborhood demographics that 
result from Tiebout sorting. The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section I 
presents a brief survey of the literature on the capitalization of the quality of the local public 
schools into house prices. Section II sketches the basic hedonic model with public goods and 
discusses the difficulty of isolating the effect of school quality. Section III describes the data 
used in the empirical estimations. Section IV presents the estimating equations and results. 
Section V summarizes the basic conclusions. 
 
I. Literature on the Capitalization of School Quality 
In an early examination of the implications of the Tiebout model, Wallace Oates (1969 
and 1973) used per pupil spending as the measure of the quality of local public education.
1 He 
found that, after controlling for effective property tax rates, median house values were higher in 
school districts with higher per pupil expenditures.
2 Rosen and Fullerton (1977) criticized the 
                                                           
1 Oates appealed explicitly to Tiebout, but two years earlier Ridker and Henning (1967) published an article focused 
on air quality and house prices in which they also attempted to account for the effect of perceived differences in 
school quality on house prices.  
2 King (1977) estimated alternative specifications of the Oates model substituting the property tax payment for the 
tax rate and obtained the same qualitative results for per pupil expenditures. 
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use of expenditures by Oates on the grounds that expenditures on inputs are not a measure of the 
output of a public good. Rosen and Fullerton replicated Oates’ study using test scores as the 
measure of school quality in the same New Jersey school districts examined by Oates. They 
obtained the same qualitative results; higher test scores were associated with higher house prices. 
Rather than using test scores, some early studies looked at the effect on house prices of a school 
district’s reputation obtained from surveys or from homeowners’ own estimates (Ridker and 
Henning, 1967; Linneman, 1980). The logic of this approach is that it is the perceived quality of 
local schools that determines the value of a house to a potential buyer. The focus of these papers 
was not the capitalization of school quality, and the results were often counterintuitive. They 
indicated that houses in neighborhoods where the schools had a “below average” or “poor” 
reputation commanded a higher price. These results could reflect a lack of control for other 
housing and neighborhood characteristics or simply a poor measure of reputation. In any case, 
test scores rather than survey measures of schools’ reputations have increasingly come to be used 
as the standard measure of quality. In the 1980s and 1990s a number of states began requiring 
standardized tests. And the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 requires that students in grades 
three through eight take statewide standardized tests every year. Since the results of these 
required tests are widely publicized, one might assume that a school’s reputation is largely based 
on the results of the tests. Thus, the distinction between reputation and a quantitative measure of 
student performance like test scores may be largely academic at this point. Most recent studies 
have used average scores from state-mandated tests or pass rates for the tests as the measure of 
quality.
3  
  Test scores, however, are not a pure measure of school quality. Other factors, such as the 
student’s native ability and family background can affect achievement on standardized tests. 
Theoretically, if test scores are the measure of student achievement, it is only the marginal effect 
of the school on those scores that should be credited as the school’s output or value added 
(Hanushek, 1986; Hayes and Taylor, 1996). Economists, therefore, have taken efforts to control 
for personal and family characteristics of the student body when estimating the effect of test 
scores on house values. Controlling for native ability presents a special challenge. Ideally it 
requires some pre-school or early-school benchmark for individual students against which to 
                                                           
3 See Haurin and Brasington, 1996; Hayes and Taylor, 1996; Downes and Zabel, 1997; Black, 1999; Brasington, 
1999 and 2000; Bradbury, Mayer, and Case, 2001; Weimer and Wolkoff, 2001; and Dills, 2001. 
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measure the school’s contribution to the student’s achievement (Summers and Wolfe, 1977; 
Hanushek and Taylor, 1990). A few studies use the change in test scores between different 
grades in a school as an indicator of a school’s value added (Sonstelie and Portney, 1980;  
Reinhard, 1981; Downes and Zabel, 1997).  But to the extent that students change schools or 
school districts between the time of the first and second test, these two sets of scores may not 
refer to the same cohort of students.
4  
At least two recent studies have decomposed cross-sectional differences in test scores 
into contributions by the schools, the influence of peers, and, in one case, the parental 
background of the students. Hayes and Taylor (1996) used prior test scores and student 
characteristics to decompose average test scores for elementary schools in the Dallas district into 
school effects and peer effects. Their measure of the peer group’s contribution had no significant 
effect on house prices.
5  On the other hand, their measure of the school’s contribution (the 
school’s value added) had a positive and significant effect on house prices in northern Dallas but 
not in southern Dallas. However, they obtained the same qualitative results by just using the 
average test scores rather than a value-added measure. Brasington and Haurin (2005) decompose 
test results in 123 Ohio school districts into a parental contribution, a school contribution, and a 
peer group contribution. They find only weak support for any effect on house prices from their 
measure of the school’s contribution to the pass rates on proficiency tests. Moreover, without any 
decomposition, the pass rates themselves had a highly significant effect on house prices. The 
authors suggest that the value-added measure may show little effect on house prices because a 
school’s value added is difficult to ascertain for both the researcher and the home buyer. 
Prospective home buyers may simply consider overall test scores the best indicator of school 
quality. 
  There has been some renewed interest in Wallace Oates’ early conclusion that per pupil 
expenditures are reflected in house prices. Several recent studies have included per pupil 
expenditures along with test scores in their estimating equations. Per pupil spending has a 
positive and significant effect on house prices over and above the effect of test scores in models 
                                                           
4 See Kane and Staiger (2002b) for a discussion of the variation in the change in test scores that is due to random 
factors or to a change in the group of students being tested. Brasington (1999) uses differences in fourth, ninth, and 
twelfth grade test scores in a given year to measure value added at the school district level. This measure admittedly 
does not reflect improvement in the same cohort of students.  
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estimated by Downes and Zabel (1997), Black (1999), and Brasington (1999).
6 Hilber and 
Mayer (2002) found that increases in per pupil expenditures are reflected in increases in house 
prices in densely populated communities, i.e., in communities in which housing supply is 
relatively inelastic. 
Other recent articles have revived the notion that it is a school’s or a district’s reputation 
that is reflected in house values. Because they did not have any quantitative measure of school 
quality, Bogart and Cromwell (1997) used a dummy variable for generally perceived poor school 
districts in their hedonic estimates of house prices in three samples of otherwise similar 
neighborhoods in the Cleveland area. The coefficients on these dummy variables for poor 
districts were all negative and significant.   Figlio and Lucas (2004) use Florida’s grading system 
as well as test scores to examine whether a school’s reputation affects house prices over and 
above the effect of average test scores. Besides the average test scores, a school’s grade depends 
on other factors, such as the improvement in scores, absentee rates, and suspension rates. The 
authors find that the letter grades given to schools by the state do affect housing prices over and 
above average test scores, although the effect has diminished over time. These results suggest 
that home buyers evaluate the quality of local public schools on more than test scores.   
  A major concern of several recent studies has been how to control for neighborhood 
characteristics that are correlated with school test scores and also raise house prices.  Bogart and 
Cromwell (1997) limited their sample to statistical planning areas in given municipalities that 
spanned two separate school districts. The use of planning areas was intended to control for the 
quality of other public services. Black (1999) limited her sample to houses close to the 
boundaries of elementary school attendance zones within school districts, and she pioneered the 
use of boundary fixed effects to control for neighborhood characteristics. Boundary fixed effects 
have now become a common control for neighborhood characteristics in hedonic estimates of the 
effect of school quality on house prices (Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2003 and 2004; Kane, 
Staiger, and Reigg, 2005). 
  While the use of boundary fixed effects addresses the issue of the contemporaneous 
correlation of other desirable neighborhood characteristics and the quality of public schools, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Even though Hayes and Taylor found no significant effect on house prices from their measure of the peer group’s 
contribution to student achievement, differences in the quality of the peer group in a school should theoretically be 
capitalized in house prices. 
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does not address the issue of the long-run effects on neighborhood demographics due to Tiebout 
sorting. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003 and 2004) have developed a general equilibrium 
model in which other desirable neighborhood characteristics are affected by the quality of public 
schools through Tiebout sorting. They find that, when we take into account Tiebout sorting, the 
full effect on house prices of differences in school quality is two to four times as great as the 
direct effect. The hedonic model in this paper does not attempt to capture the indirect effects of 
school quality on house prices due to Tiebout sorting; it is in the tradition of earlier studies that 
use control variables to keep neighborhood characteristics constant.  
     
II. The Basic Hedonic Model with Public Goods 
  The theoretical foundations for estimating the implicit (hedonic) price of the structural, 
neighborhood, and public-goods characteristics of a given property were developed by Sherwin 
Rosen (1974).  The bundle of goods combined in any two houses may be heterogeneous, but 
there is an assumed common price structure for the embodied characteristics or attributes.  Since 
houses are associated with location, the quantity and quality of each of the public goods in that 
location are among the attributes contained in the housing bundle. The housing bundle itself can 
be defined as z where 
  z = (z1, z2 , . . . zn ) 
and each of the elements of the vector z represents the quantity of a given attribute of the housing 
bundle. The market price of a house, P(z), will be a function of the vector z. And the implicit 











   (1) 
 where z –i  is the vector of all the characteristics except zi. This implicit price function for 
attribute zi  will be determined by households maximizing their utility subject to their budget 
constraint and housing producers maximizing their profits.  
  The utility function of the household can be represented by 
  U = u(z, x; θ)                          ( 2 )  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Hayes and Taylor (1996) found no significant effect of per pupil spending on house prices when test scores were 
entered in their equations. 
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where x represents the composite non-housing good and θ represents the household’s preferences 
for the non-housing good and housing characteristics. If we normalize prices by the price of the 
non-housing good, then the budget constraint for each household will be  
 y   =   x   +   P ( z )                        ( 3 )  
where y equals household income.  
In any given period, suppliers of housing include both developers and owners of existing 
homes. They maximize their profit π (z) where  
  π (z) = P(z) – C( ;  s z sd ,  p    z,  z z ) )                   ( 4 )  
C(z) is the cost of providing a house with attributes z.  
I have distinguished the elements z by subscripts s, d, and p. The structural or site 
characteristics of a property, such as the size of the lot or the age of the structure, are subscripted 
s. The socio-demographic characteristics of the neighborhood are subscripted by d. The public 
characteristics, such as proximity to shopping or employment, neighborhood safety, air quality, 
school quality, municipal services, and local tax rates, are subscripted p. In this notation, the 
school district property tax rate is a public characteristic that carries a negative price, and the net 
value of the local public education system is a combination of the quality of the schools and the 
taxes imposed to provide that quality.
7 For the individual home buyer the tradeoff is not between 
per pupil expenditures and test scores but between school property taxes and test scores. 
Therefore, any study that attempts to measure the effect of school quality on house prices across 
districts must account for differential property tax rates. 
The important feature of the socio-demographic and public characteristics of a 
neighborhood is that they are not determined by individual housing suppliers; hence the notation 
d z  and  p z  in the profit function. The characteristics of a neighborhood can change over time and 
perhaps in response to the quality of local public education, but to the housing supplier they are 
exogenous.
8  
                                                           
7 Since it is not possible to determine the cost of raising test scores by any given amount, one cannot determine from 
most econometric studies what combination of tax rates and school expenditures would maximize house values. 
Hanushek’s review of econometric studies (1986) suggests that there is no proven relationship between school 
inputs or spending levels and student achievement. Brueckner (1979) estimates the effects of per pupil expenditures 
on house prices without controlling for taxes. He argues that under some fairly strong assumptions his results 
indicate that local public education is over-provided in his sample of northeastern New Jersey communities. The 
communities could raise housing values by lowering both their tax rates and expenditures on education.  
8 Developers of new tracts may have some control over public characteristics such as open space and traffic patterns. 
However, once provided, these characteristics are provided to all the houses in the development, and they become 
fixed characteristics for the purchasers of the newly built houses. Some new public characteristics, like the opening 
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Those structural and site characteristics of a house that were present in the previous 
period are designated  s z ) . These are singled out because they constrain the set of characteristics 
that a supplier can offer in the current period. For example, in fully developed neighborhoods, 
the lot size of a dwelling generally cannot be changed, although lots are sometimes subdivided. 
Central air can be added to a house that has radiator heat, but only at a higher cost than in houses 
that already have heating ducts. Thus the cost of providing any combination of characteristics   
in the current period depends on the combination in the previous period 
s z
s z ) .
9 Finally, the cost to 
the supplier of providing any set of public and non-public characteristics z in a given period will 
depend on what the supplier has to pay for the combination that existed in the previous period 
P(z)
) ) . Thus the type of house provided in a given neighborhood will depend on the 
neighborhood’s history and the character of the original housing. We will account for this by 
including in our estimating equations the age of the house and distance from the central business 
district (CBD). 
 
III. The Data  
  In the U.S., it is the quality and not the quantity of public education that distinguishes one 
school district or neighborhood school from another. The law guarantees students in most states 
a public education through their high school years, but the quality of that education can vary 
from district to district and from school to school. We use data from Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania, a suburban county in the Philadelphia metro area, to estimate the effect of 
differences in school quality on house prices. 
  We have combined data from four major sources to estimate the effect of elementary and 
secondary school quality on house prices in Montgomery County. Data on the sale prices of 
houses and housing characteristics come from the Montgomery County assessor’s file. This file 
includes the latest sale price and the previous sale price as well as certain structural 
characteristics for each house in the county. The data on schools and school districts come from 
the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA) database. Data on school district and 
municipal property tax rates and on crime rates come from the Pennsylvania Department of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of a shopping center or office park nearby, may change the housing bundle and therefore the market value of the 
house without any action on the part of the property owner. 
9 For a developer of new homes there may be few non-public characteristics from the previous period except lot 
size. 
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Community and Economic Development. Neighborhood characteristics, such as median 
household income or percent elderly in the census block group, are taken from the 2000 census 
files. 
Data on Housing Units. Our source for the market prices of houses and their major 
characteristics is the Montgomery County assessor’s file. We selected home sales that took place 
between January and July 2000. We dropped from our sample any home that was sold for less 
than $25,000 to eliminate any transactions that were not arms-length. This resulted in a loss of 
only 32 observations. There were 3150 home sales remaining in the 21 school districts in 
Montgomery County over this seven-month period with sufficient data in the assessor’s files and 
our other data sources to use for this study.
10 We confine our sample to sales over a seven-month 
period for several reasons. We do not have to convert sale prices in different periods to constant 
dollars. We do not have to account for changes over time in the elementary school attendance 
zones. And the same information about property tax rates and test scores through the 1998-99 
school year would have been available to all prospective home buyers. 
The assessor’s records also include a number of the characteristics of the property that are 
important determinants of house price. Perhaps the most important distinction among the 
properties is whether the house is attached or detached. This distinction was no longer available 
after 1996 from the assessor’s office, but for units built before 1996 we obtained the information 
from the 1996 file by matching addresses. For units built after that time, the variable for attached 
and detached was determined by lot size. Post-1996 units with a lot size of 0.129 acre or less 
were coded attached. In the 1996 assessor’s file only 5 percent of detached homes had lot sizes 
that small, and 81 percent of the attached houses had lot sizes of 0.129 acre or less.  
There are a number of property characteristics in the assessor’s file that are represented 
by continuous variables. These include the age of the structure, lot size, square feet of living 
space, number of bedrooms, and the number of full bathrooms. Other characteristics are reported 
in binary form (yes/no). These include the presence of a basement, central air conditioning, a 
fireplace, and a garage. The presence of one or more of these features often reflects overall 
quality differentials in otherwise similar houses, so the estimated coefficients should not 
                                                           
10 There are officially 22 school districts in Montgomery County. But the Bryn Athyn School District has no schools 
of its own; the district pays for its public school students to attend schools in other districts. The Boyertown School 
District is partially in Montgomery County and partially in Berks County. Houses in that school district are not in 
our database.  
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necessarily be interpreted as the added value from the characteristic itself. For about one-third of 
our observations the number of baths was missing. Because this is such an important structural 
characteristic, the number of baths for these houses was imputed using the age of the house, the 
square feet of living space, the number of bedrooms, and the dummy variables for whether the 
house was attached and whether it had a basement, central air, or a fireplace. 
  Data on Schools. The PSSA database contains information at the district level and the 
school level on average scores and the distribution of scores for the PSSA math and reading tests 
for fifth, eighth, and eleventh grades.
11 In separate regressions we use both the fifth and eleventh 
grade math and reading scores and the sum of the two scores as measures of the quality of the 
local elementary school and the high school. We also use district-wide averages for these fifth 
and eleventh grade scores in a parallel set of regressions.
12 The PSSA database begins with the 
1995-96 school year, but we did not use the test scores from that year because differences in 
scores in the first year of testing could reflect the inexperience of the school staffs in preparing 
the students and administering the tests. We averaged the mean test scores for the 1996-97, 
1997-98, and 1998-99 school years to minimize the effect of year-to-year variation in scores that 
may not reflect differences in school quality.
13   Kane and Staiger (2001) estimate that for an 
elementary school of average size in North Carolina almost 40 percent of the variance in reading 
test scores among schools is due to sampling variation and other non-persistent sources of 
variation.
14 Sampling variation occurs because abilities vary among the cohorts of children in the 
same school who take the test for a given grade level in different years. Other non-persistent 
sources of variation can include widespread illness in the school on the day of the test or 
                                                           
11 The distribution is given by the percentage of students in each school or district that scored in each quartile of the 
state distribution. 
12 Only one of the 21 school districts in our Montgomery County sample has more than one high school—Lower 
Merion. Therefore, the eleventh grade scores are the same for the district and the school averages in every other 
district.   In the 1999-2000 school year 48 of the 442 eleventh graders in the Norristown District attended two other 
schools besides Norristown High School. Since we do not know where these students lived, we assigned all houses 
in the district to Norristown High. In the Spring-Ford school district all fifth grade students were assigned to the 
Spring-Ford intermediate school beginning in the 1999-2000 school year. Since our price data on home sales are 
from the year 2000 we used district-wide fifth grade test scores for the Spring-Ford District. 
13 Since our data on house sales were for the first seven months of 2000, we did not use the test scores after the 
1998-99 school year. Potential home buyers in the first seven months of 2000 would not have had the information 
on test scores from the 1999-2000 school year, but the scores from 1998-99 would have been available. School 
administrators get the test scores from the preceding academic year in September or October, and the scores are 
widely publicized and available on the State Department of Education website by the end of November. 
14 The average size of the elementary schools is 60 students per grade. The percent of the variance in math scores 
due to sampling variation and other non-persistent sources of variation is smaller than in the case of reading scores. 
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classroom distractions such as nearby construction activity. These sources of variation argue for 
some averaging of test scores across years to obtain a stable measure of school quality.  
Our data set includes other variables at the school and the district level that could be 
classified as measures of inputs into the education process. These include expenditures per pupil 
at the district level and class size at the school level. We have already noted the objections to per 
pupil expenditures as a measure of school quality, and there is no consensus on the effect of class 
size on student achievement (Hanushek, 1986). But the data allow us to test whether these input 
measures affect house prices independently of any effect they have on student achievement as 
measured by test scores. Data on per pupil expenditures are not available for some school 
districts so regressions that include this variable are estimated with 2846 observations. 
Offsetting the value added by the local public schools as measured by student achievement and 
other characteristics of the schools is the cost to the individual homeowner of the local public 
education system. The primary cost to the homeowner is the property tax levied by the school 
district. We have data on property tax rates by school district from the Pennsylvania Department 
of Community and Economic Development. Differentials in these tax rates should be reflected in 
house prices. It is, of course, the difference in effective tax rates and not statutory tax rates that is 
reflected in house prices. But all properties in Montgomery County were reassessed in 1997 with 
the new assessments applied in 1998. Since we use property tax rates for 1999, we assume that 
differences in the statutory rates were very close to differences in effective tax rates so soon after 
the new countywide assessments were applied. 
Data on Municipalities.  The Montgomery County files include a municipality code for 
every structure, and the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development 
publishes data on municipalities that include property tax rates and the number of violent crimes 
by year. We use the municipal property tax rate for 1999. For our measure of the crime rate we 
use the average number of violent crimes per 1000 residents for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. 
The crime rate is not available for nine of the 56 municipalities in our dataset. For these 
municipalities we enter dummy variables in those regressions in which the municipal crime rates 
appear. This affects 132 of our 3150 observations. 
Data on Neighborhood Characteristics. Using GIS software we geocoded all the 
properties in our sample by census block group, and data from the 2000 census were used to 
capture neighborhood characteristics. We have data on the following characteristics of 
  10 
population and housing in the census block group—percent age 65 and over, percent nonwhite, 
percent with a graduate degree, median household income, and the percent of houses that are 
owner-occupied. From the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission we have data on the 
driving distance from the census tract to the central business district in Philadelphia. This 
provides some measure of the accessibility to the central city.
15
The definitions, means, and standard deviations of the variables used in the regression 
analysis in part IV are reported in Table 1. 
 
IV. The Estimating Equations and Results 
  Several early studies of the effect of school quality on house prices used a linear hedonic 
model with the median value of houses by census tract or municipality as the dependent 
variable.
16 Most recent studies, however, have used a semi-log model with the log of individual 
house price as the dependent variable.
17 And a few studies have used a difference in difference 
approach, estimating the effect of changes or first differences in the explanatory variables on the 
change in house prices.
18 Linneman (1980) explicitly raised the issue of the proper functional 
form of the hedonic model. He suggests a Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable 





, where lambda and the coefficients on the independent 
variables are estimated by maximum likelihood. When lambda equals one the functional form 
will be linear, and as lambda approaches zero the function approaches the semi-log form in 
which the dependent variable is the log of house value.
19 When lambda equals zero the Box-Cox 
estimation uses the natural log of house price as the dependent variable. 
We estimated the basic equations reported in Table 3 with both a semi-log model and a 
Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable. We report only the semi-log results 
throughout the paper because the results from the Box-Cox model are not qualitatively different 
                                                           
15 These estimates of the mean driving distance to Center City Philadelphia were made in 1990; more recent 
estimates are not available. 
16 Ridker and Henning (1967), Oates (1969 and 1973), Rosen and Fullerton (1977), King (1977), and Reinhard 
(1981). 
17 Haurin and Brasington (1996), Hayes and Taylor (1996), Downes and Zabel (1997), Bogart and Cromwell (1997), 
Goodman and Thibodeau (1998), Black (1999), Brasington (1999 and 2000), and Weimer and Wolkoff (2001). 
18 Bradbury, Mayer, and Case (2001), Dills (2001), and Hilber and Mayer (2002). 
19 The Box-Cox transformation can be performed on the continuous independent variables as well as on the 
dependent variable. Halvorsen and Pollakowski (1981) and Cropper, Deck, and McConnell (1988) also argue for 
some form of a Box-Cox estimation. See also the evaluation of the Box-Cox transformation in Sheppard (1999). 
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and they are not as easy to interpret as the semi-log results. In all our Box-Cox models, the 
estimated lambda was approximately 0.06, which is very close to the semi-log specification in 
any case. 
The basic estimating equation is  
q m n  + ijkqn +M +C ijkqn i x j s k d c VX S D α βββ ββ ε + =+ +  
where 
ijkqn V = The natural log of the price of property with structural characteristics i in 
elementary or high school attendance zone j, in school district k, in municipality q, and in census 
block group n. 
i X =The structural characteristics of property i. 
j S =Average test scores for the relevant class and class size for school j.
20
k D =School district property taxes, expenditures per pupil, and district-wide average test 
scores. 
q M =Municipal property taxes and the incidence of violent crime in the municipality.  
n C =Census block-group variables that describe the demographic characteristics of the 
neighborhood and a location variable. 
The need to adequately account for the non-school public goods, differing municipal tax 
rates ( m M ), and different neighborhood characteristics ( ) has prompted some researchers to 
narrow their sample to small neighborhoods. For example, Bogart and Cromwell (1997) select 
houses in the same “statistical planning area” in a single municipality that sold over an 18-year 
period. They have three samples of houses in three statistical planning areas, each of which is 
served by two school districts.
n C
21 They represent the difference in school quality by a dummy 
variable for the “poor school district” in each sample. They find a negative and significant effect 
of “poor quality” in all three samples after controlling for housing characteristics. Since Bogart 
and Cromwell use dummy variables for school quality, they cannot identify the characteristics of 
the “better school district” that result in higher house prices.
22 Sandra Black (1999) uses a 
different data selection process to control for neighborhood characteristics. She selects homes 
                                                           
20 Except for the Lower Merion School District, the geographic area of the high school attendance zone and the 
school district are coterminous. The Lower Merion School District has two high schools. Thus, in the Lower Merion 
District, houses were also separated into the two high school attendance zones.  
21 The statistical planning areas range in size from three to six census tracts. 
22 Since they do not include a school tax variable in their regressions, Bogart and Cromwell’s estimated coefficient 
captures the combined effect of differential taxes and school quality. 
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sold within approximately one-third of a mile of the intra-district boundaries of elementary 
school attendance areas and uses a dummy for each boundary in her regressions. The dummy is 
meant to control for neighborhood characteristics. The assumption is that neighborhood 
characteristics are continuous at the boundary and only school quality is discontinuous. Black 
estimates positive and significant coefficients for the average fourth grade test scores for her 
sample. Her procedure, however, only allows her to measure the effect of intra-district 
differences in test scores and only at the elementary level. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003 
and 2004) follow Black’s procedure and use a subset of houses within a quarter mile of school 
district boundaries and boundary dummies to control for neighborhood effects.
23 We will test our 
results by limiting our sample to houses within one-half mile of school district boundaries and 
using boundary dummies to control for neighborhood characteristics. 
We use the basic hedonic regression model described above and our data from 
Montgomery County to address three questions: 
(1) Which measure of public school quality has the most significant effect on house 
prices – individual school scores or district-wide scores? 
(2) Do inputs into the education process (class size or per pupil expenditures) affect 
house prices after accounting for student achievement? 
(3) Does the measured effect of student achievement on house prices diminish when 
neighborhoods are defined more narrowly and boundary dummies are used to capture 
neighborhood effects? 
In order to better interpret the coefficients on test scores, we measure them in standard 
deviations across schools in Montgomery County (Tables 2a and 2b). The variation in math 
scores at both grade levels is higher than the variation in reading scores. This is true at both the 
individual school level (Table 2a) and at the district level (Table 2b).  The correlations of 
average reading and math scores for fifth and eleventh grades in Montgomery County are 
presented in the lower panels of Tables 2a and 2b. Reading and math scores for the same grade 
level are highly correlated (approximately 0.90), so it is impossible to determine by regression 
analysis which test score at the same grade level is the better signal of school quality. The 
correlations of test scores across grade levels for the same subject are considerably lower (from 
                                                           
23 Since their sample is from California post-proposition 13, the authors assume that property tax rates are the same 
across school districts. 
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0.67 to 0.78), and it is possible to identify for each subject at which grade level the score has the 
most significant effect on house prices.  
In our first set of regressions (Table 3) we test each of the average test scores and the sum 
of the scores for individual schools as predictors of house prices controlling for a standard set of 
property taxes, structural characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics. For all our 
regressions we report robust standard errors. The estimated coefficients on the control variables 
all have the expected sign, and they are significant at least at the 10 percent level. The 
coefficients on the variables of interest, the average test scores, are positive and significant at the 
1 percent level for all the scores except eleventh grade reading. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in these scores raises house prices between 1.7 percent and 2.4 percent, depending on 
which score we use. The eleventh grade reading score (Table 3, column 5) is the weakest 
indicator of house prices in our sample. While the coefficient is positive, its significance level is 
just shy of the commonly accepted 10 percent threshold (p = .103). The results of Pennsylvania’s 
eleventh grade reading test are a less reliable measure of student achievement and school quality 
than the results of the other tests. All standardized tests are not created equal when it comes to 
measuring achievement. 
In Table 4 we repeat the regressions in Table 3 using district-wide averages rather than 
the average scores for the individual schools. The estimated coefficients for the average district 
scores are all higher than for the average individual school scores. And except for eleventh grade 
reading the standard errors on the coefficients are consistently lower. At the district level, the 
coefficient on the average eleventh grade reading score is significant at the 10 percent level, but 
it remains a weak indicator of school quality. 
In the regressions reported in Table 5 we attempt to determine whether fifth or eleventh 
grade test scores are better predictors of house prices. At the individual school level, eleventh 
grade math scores are better predictors of house prices than fifth grade math scores. For all other 
scores at either the individual school level or the district level (math, reading, and the sum of the 
two scores), the fifth grade scores are better predictors of house prices than the eleventh grade 
scores. Later we will test the robustness of this result using different controls for neighborhood 
characteristics.  
The results in Tables 3 through 5 also suggest that district-wide averages of fifth grade 
scores are better predictors of house prices than averages at the individual school level. The 
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regressions reported in Table 6 test this hypothesis. Both school-level and district-level scores 
are included in each of these regressions. In each case (math, reading, and the sum of the two), 
the coefficient on the district-level score is positive and significant at the 1 percent level and the 
coefficient on the score at the individual school level is essentially zero. Thus, intra-district 
differences in elementary school scores do not affect house prices in our sample.
24  This differs 
from Sandra Black’s result. She found that intra-district differences in test scores had positive 
and significant effects on house prices.
25
The regressions reported in Tables 7 and 8 address the issue of whether other 
characteristics of the school or the district affect the perceived quality of local public education 
as reflected in house prices. We look at class size and expenditures per pupil. These two factors 
can undoubtedly influence student achievement and test scores; the issue is whether they are 
independent indicators of school quality and house prices after accounting for student 
achievement. We estimate the independent effect of class size at the level of the individual 
school because our data on class size is at the school level. The evidence for the effect of class 
size is presented in Table 7. Class size at the elementary school level has no significant effect on 
house prices after accounting for student achievement (Table 7, columns 1 to 3), and there is 
little change in the coefficients on the test scores from our original regressions (Table 3). At the 
high school level, however, a higher percentage of classes with 24 or more students does have a 
negative effect on house prices, and the effect is significant at the 5 percent level (Table 7, 
columns 4 to 6). This result runs counter to the common perception that parents are most 
concerned about class size in the elementary school. Class size seems to have an independent 
effect on house prices only at the high school level. 
For per pupil expenditures we have data only at the district level. Therefore we estimate 
the independent effect of school expenditures on house prices using average test scores for the 
district. The coefficients on expenditures have the expected sign in the regressions in Table 8, 
but none is statistically significant. The inclusion of per pupil expenditures does, however, raise 
the estimated coefficients on the test scores relative to the estimates in Table 4, and the 
                                                           
24 A similar test is not possible for high school scores because in our sample only one district, Lower Merion, has 
more than one high school. 
25  She effectively controlled for any inter-district differences in school quality by using dummies for intra-district 
elementary school boundaries. A dummy variable for each district can be calculated from a linear combination of a 
subset of the boundary dummies.  
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coefficient on the eleventh grade reading score is now much more significant. One can argue that 
including per pupil expenditures in the hedonic equation renders the coefficient on test scores a 
measure of efficiency. That is, the coefficient reflects the effect on house prices of a rise in test 
scores when per pupil expenditures are held constant. We suggest that this may offer an 
explanation for the increase in the size of the coefficients on test scores in the regressions in 
Table 8. Home buyers may be interested not only in higher student achievement but also in 
bringing it about more efficiently. This conclusion remains tentative, however, given the fact that 
the expenditure variable is never significant.  
Our final goal is to test whether limiting our sample to neighborhoods on school district 
boundaries and using boundary dummies to proxy for neighborhood characteristics diminishes 
the effect of test scores on house prices. We choose a subset of houses in our sample within one-
half mile of each school district boundary. We exclude those boundaries defined by the 
Schuylkill River or any of the limited access highways in Montgomery County (I-76, I-286, I-
486, and PA-309). We assign a dummy variable to each remaining boundary between two 
districts. If the Schuylkill River or one of the limited access highways intersects a district 
boundary, each section of the boundary is assigned a different dummy variable. 
In Tables 9 and 10 we compare the coefficients on the test scores using the full sample 
and the full set of neighborhood characteristics with the coefficients using the limited sample and 
boundary dummies to control for neighborhood characteristics. To examine whether the 
differences in the coefficients are due simply to the change in the sample, we reestimate the 
original regression with the detailed neighborhood characteristics using the smaller sample. The 
results for the elementary school test scores are given in Table 9. The estimates using the full 
sample and the full set of neighborhood variables show a positive and significant relationship 
between elementary school scores and house prices (columns 1, 4, and 7). These results are 
identical to the regression results reported in Table 4. The estimates using the limited sample and 
district boundary dummies show no significant relationship between elementary school scores 
and house prices (columns 2, 5, and 8). But this result is partially due to the smaller sample size. 
The estimation with the full set of neighborhood characteristics using the smaller boundary 
sample also does not produce a significant coefficient on the fifth grade math or reading scores 
or the sum of the two (columns 3, 6, and 9).  
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The results are more positive for the high school test scores (Table 10). Higher test scores 
for the eleventh grade have a positive and significant effect on house prices in both the full 
sample and the smaller sample of houses using boundary dummies (columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8). 
The standard errors are larger for the smaller sample, but the point estimates are also larger. 
Moreover, the eleventh grade reading score becomes more significant in the model with school 
district boundary dummies. If we assume that boundary dummies are a better control for 
neighborhood characteristics than the set of detailed characteristics in our original equation, we 
would raise our estimate of the effect of high school scores on house prices. These results of the 
model with boundary dummies suggest that the most reliable indicators of the quality of public 
schools are district-wide high school scores. When we apply the model with the full set of 
neighborhood characteristics to the smaller sample, however, we do not get significant results for 
the eleventh grade scores. 
 
V. Conclusions 
The requirement of annual testing in the No Child Left Behind Act has led to increased 
interest in the relationship between scores on standardized tests as a measure of school quality 
and house prices. This paper has used the test scores from the Pennsylvania System of School 
Assessment (PSSA) in Montgomery County to examine that relationship. Several conclusions 
can be drawn from that examination. In our baseline regressions (Tables 3 and 4) the weakest 
link between test scores and housing prices is the link between high school reading scores and 
house prices. We have suggested that the PSSA eleventh grade reading test may not be a 
particularly reliable gauge of student achievement or school quality. When we add other school 
characteristics or other controls for neighborhood characteristics, however, the link between 
eleventh grade reading scores and house prices becomes much stronger. Among other 
characteristics of individual schools and school districts, class size matters at the high school 
level but not at the elementary school level. Per pupil expenditures, however, do not affect house 
prices over and above their effect on student achievement.  
Prospective home buyers appear to value school quality primarily at the district level. In 
the regressions using our full sample of 3150 observations, intra-district differences in 
elementary school scores are not a significant determinant of house prices once we control for 
district-wide averages. When we restrict our sample and use school district boundary dummies to 
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control for neighborhood characteristics, we find that district-wide high school scores 
significantly affect house prices, but elementary school scores do not. Although these results are 
tentative because of the smaller sample size of houses on district boundaries, they support our 
earlier conclusion about the primary importance of the school district. In effect, prospective 
home buyers base their offers on differences across school districts rather than across school 
attendance zones in the same district.  
 




Bayer, Patrick, Fernando Ferreira, and Robert McMillan. “A Unified Framework for Measuring 
Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods,” Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 
No. 872, Yale University, November 2003. 
 
Bayer, Patrick, Fernando Ferreira, and Robert McMillan. “Tiebout Sorting, Social Multipliers 
and the Demand for School Quality,” NBER Working Paper No. 10871, October 2004.  
 
Bayer, Patrick, Robert McMillan, and Kim Reuben. “An Equilibrium Model of Sorting in an 
Urban Housing Market,” NBER Working Paper No. 10865, October 2004.  
 
Benabou, Roland. “Workings of a City: Location, Education, and Production,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), pp. 619-652.  
 
Benabou, Roland. “Heterogeneity, Stratification, and Growth: Macroeconomic Implications of 
Community Structure and School Finance,” American Economic Review, 86 (1996), pp. 
584-609.  
 
Black, Sandra E. “Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1999), pp. 577-599.  
 
Bogart, William T., and Brian A. Cromwell. “How Much More Is a Good School District 
Worth?” National Tax Journal, 50 (1997), pp. 215-232.   
 
Bradbury, Katharine L., Christopher J. Mayer, and Karl E. Case. “Property Tax Limits, Local 
Fiscal Behavior, and Property Values: Evidence from Massachusetts under Proposition 
2½,” Journal of Public Economics, 80 (2001), pp. 287-311. 
 
Brasington, David M. “Which Measures of School Quality Does the Housing Market Value?” 
Journal of Real Estate Research, 18 (1999), pp. 395-413.  
 
Brasington, David M. “Demand and Supply of Public School Quality in Metropolitan Areas: The 
Role of Private Schools,” Journal of Regional Science, 40 (2000) pp. 583-605.  
 
Brasington, David M., and Donald R. Haurin. “Capitalization of Parent, School, and Peer Group 
Components of School Quality into House Prices,” Department of Economics, Louisiana 
State University, Working Paper 2005-04 (2005). 
 
Brueckner, Jan K. “Property Values, Local Public Expenditure and Economic Efficiency,” 
Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1979), pp. 223-245.  
 
  19 
Cropper, Maureen L., Leland B. Deck, and Kenneth E. McConnell. “On the Choice of 
Functional Form for Hedonic Price Functions,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 70 
(1988), pp. 668-675. 
 
Dills, Angela K. “Do Parents Value Changes in Test Scores? High Stakes Testing in Texas,” 
Boston University, Nov. 20, 2001. 
 
Downes, Thomas A., and Jeffrey E. Zabel. “The Impact of School Characteristics on House 
Prices: Chicago 1987-1991,” mimeo, Tufts University, August 1997. 
 
Fernandez, Raquel, and Richard Rogerson. “Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality 
of Public Education,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1996), pp. 135-164. 
 
Figlio, David N., and Maurice E. Lucas. “What’s in a Grade? School Report Cards and the 
Housing Market,” American Economic Review 94 (2004), pp. 591-603. 
 
Goodman, Alan C., and Thibodeau, Thomas G. “Housing Market Segmentation,” Journal of 
Housing Economics, 7 (1998), pp. 121-43.  
 
Halvorsen, Robert, and Henry O. Pollakowski. “Choice of Function Form for Hedonic Price 
Equations,” Journal of Urban Economics, 10 (1981), pp. 37-49. 
 
Hanushek, Eric A. “The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 24 (1986), pp. 1141-1177.  
 
Hanushek, Eric A., and Lori L. Taylor. “Alternative Assessments of Performance of Schools: 
Measurement of State Variations in Achievement,” Journal of Human Resources, 25 
(1990), pp. 179-201.  
 
Haurin, D., and D. Brasington. “School Quality and Real House Prices: Intra- and 
Interjurisdictional Effects,” Journal of Housing Economics 5 (1996), pp. 351-368.   
 
Hayes, Kathy J., and Lori L. Taylor. “Neighborhood School Characteristics: What Signals 
Quality to Homebuyers?” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1996), pp. 
2-9.   
 
Hilber, Christian A., and Christopher J. Mayer. “Why Do Households Without Children Support 
Local Public Schools? Linking House Price Capitalization to School Spending,” Working 
Paper 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, June 2002.  
 
Kane, Thomas J., and Douglas O. Staiger. “Improving School Accountability Measures,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 8156, March 2001.  
 
Kane, Thomas J., and Douglas O. Staiger. "The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School 
Accountability Measures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (2002a), pp. 91-114. 
 
  20 
Kane, Thomas J., and Douglas O. Staiger. "Volatility in School Test Scores: Implications for 
Test-Based Accountability Systems," in Brookings Papers on Education Policy, ed. 
Dianne Ravitch, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2002b, pp. 235-83. 
 
Kane, Thomas J., Douglas O. Staiger, and Stephanie K. Reigg. “School Quality, Neighborhoods 
and Housing Prices: The Impacts of School Desegregation,” NBER Working Paper No. 
11347, May 2005.  
 
Kane, Thomas J., and Douglas O. Staiger, and Gavin Samms. “School Accountability Ratings 
and Housing Values,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 2003, pp. 83-137.  
 
King, Thomas A. “Estimating Property Tax Capitalization: A Critical Comment,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 85 (1977), pp. 425-431.  
 
Linneman, Peter. “Some Empirical Results on the Nature of the Hedonic Price Function for the 
Urban Housing Market,” Journal of Urban Economics, 8 (1980), pp. 47-68. 
 
Nechyba, Thomas J. “School Finance Induced Migration and Stratification Patterns: The Impact 
of Private School Vouchers,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1 (1999), pp. 5-50. 
 
Nechyba, Thomas J. “Mobility, Targeting, and Private-School Vouchers,” American Economic 
Review, 90 (2000), pp. 130-146. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. “The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property 
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 77 (1969), pp. 957-971.  
 
Oates, Wallace E. “The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property 
Values: A Reply and Yet Further Results,” Journal of Political Economy, 81 (1973), pp. 
1004-1008.  
 
Reinhard, Raymond A. “Estimating Property Tax Capitalization: A Further Comment,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 89 (1981), pp. 1251-1260. 
 
Ridker, Ronald G., and John A. Henning. “The Determinants of Residential Property Values 
with Special Reference to Air Pollution,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 49 (1967), 
pp. 246-257.  
 
Rosen, Harvey S., and David J. Fullerton. “A Note on Local Tax Rates, Public Benefit Levels, 
and Property Values,” Journal of Political Economy, 85 (1977), pp. 433-440.  
 
Rosen, Sherwin. “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure 
Competition,” Journal of Political Economy, 82 (1974), pp. 34-55. 
 
Sheppard, Stephen. “Hedonic Analysis of Housing Markets,” in Handbook of Regional and 
Urban Economics, Vol. 3, Applied Urban Economics, ed. Paul Cheshire and Edwin S. 
  21 
Mills, NY: North-Holland, 1999, pp. 1595-1635. 
 
Sonstelie, Jon C., and Paul R. Portney. “Gross Rents and Market Values: Testing the 
Implications of Tiebout’s Hypothesis,” Journal of Urban Economics, 7 (1980), pp. 102-
118.  
 
Summers, Anita A., and Barbara L. Wolfe. “Do Schools Make a Difference?” American 
Economic Review, 67 (1977), pp. 639-652.  
 
Tiebout, Charles. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64 
(1956), pp. 416-424. 
 
Weimer, David L., and Michael J. Wolkoff. “School Performance and Housing Values: Using 
Non-Contiguous District and Incorporation Boundaries to Identify School Effects,” 
National Tax Journal, 54 (2001), pp. 231-253. 
  22 
 
Table 1 
Variables, Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations 
N=3150 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION  MEAN  STD. 
DEV. 
   
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 
HP  Sale price of the house  184.95 122.45 
LN(HP)  Log of sale price of the house  11.97 0.54 
AGE  Age of the house in 2000  40.83 25.20 
LTSIZE  Size of the lot in acres  0.32 0.60 
LVSQFT  Square feet of living space (00s)  19.16 8.21 
BDRM  Number of bedrooms  3.35 0.82 
BATH  Number of full baths  2.09 0.63 
ATTCHD  = 1 if attached dwelling, = 0 otherwise  0.29 NR 
BSMT  = 1 if house has a basement; = 0 otherwise  0.90 NR 
AIR  = 1 of house has central air;  = 0 otherwise  0.53 NR 
FIREPL  = 1 if house has a fireplace; = 0 otherwise  0.56 NR 
GAR  = 1 if house has a garage; = 0 otherwise  0.66 NR 
    
SCHOOL AND SCHOOL DISTRICT VARIABLES 
MATH5 
Average 5
th grade math score 1996-97, 1997-98, and 
1998-99 for the local school  1391.48 57.62 
MATH5_DIST 
Average 5
th grade math score 1996-97, 1997-98, and 
1998-99 for the district  1390.03 51.81 
READ5 
Average 5
th grade reading score 1996-97, 1997-98, 
and 1998-99 for the local school  1379.08 51.36 
READ5_DIST 
Average 5
th grade reading score 1996-97, 1997-98, 
and 1998-99 for the district  1377.68 45.84 
SUM5 
Average of the sum of the 5
th grade math and reading 




Average of the sum of the 5
th grade math and reading 
scores 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 for the district  2767.71 96.27 
MATH11 
Average 11
th grade math score 1996-97, 1997-98, 
1998-99 for the local high school  1385.23 64.77 
MATH11_DIST 
Average 11
th grade math score 1996-97, 1997-98, 
1998-99 for the district  1385.23 64.73 
READ11 
Average 11
th grade reading score 1996-97, 1997-98, 
and 1998-99 for the local high school  1368.28 46.96 
READ11_DIST 
Average 11
th grade reading score 1996-97, 1997-98, 
and 1998-99 for the district  1368.58 47.23 
SUM11 
Average of the sum of the 11
th grade math and reading 
scores 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 for the local 
high school 
2753.51 108.72 
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SUM11_DIST 
Average of the sum of the 11
th grade math and reading 
scores 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 for the district  2753.81 109.12 
ESCS24+ 
Percent of elementary school classes with 24 or more 
pupils  (average 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99)  40.01 24.34 
HSCS24+ 
Percent of high school classes with 24 or more pupils  
(average 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99)  42.45 11.79 
EXPUPIL 
School district expenditures per pupil (average 1996-
97, 1997-98, 1998-99) ($000)  8.98 1.42 
SDPTAX 
School district Property tax rate 1999 (mills of 
assessed value)  15.67 3.01 
    
MUNICIPALITY VARIABLES 
MUNPTAX 
Municipal property tax rate 1999 (mills of assessed 
value)  2.06 1.19 
CRIMERATE 
Number of violent crimes per thousand residents 
(average 1997, 1998, 1999)  1.96 2.41 
    
CENSUS BLOCK GROUP AND LOCATION VARIABLES 
65+  Proportion of population age 65 and over  0.15 0.07 
NONWT  Proportion of population non-white  0.13 0.12 
OWN  Proportion of houses owner-occupied  0.78 0.18 
GRAD  Proportion of population 25+ with a graduate degree  0.17 0.12 
MED INC  Median household income 1999 ($000)  70.60 26.09 
DISTCBD  Highway distance to Philadelphia CBD (miles)  18.69 7.94 
 
NR = Not Relevant 




Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Reading and Math Test Scores Across Schools 
Grades 5 and 11 
 
Means and Standard Deviations 
  Math5 Read5  Math11  Read11 
Mean 
Score  1387.47 1373.88 1385.91 1366.82 
Standard 
Deviation  61.70 58.24 64.82 45.14 
 
Correlations 
Scores Math5 Read5  Math11  Read11 
Math5  1      
Read5  0.92 
N=73  1    
Math11  0.73 
N=73 
0.74 
N=73  1  





N=22  1 
 
Table 2b 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Reading and Math Test Scores Across Districts 
Grades 5 and 11 
 
Means and Standard Deviations 
  Math5 Read5  Math11  Read11 
Mean 
Score  1380.00 1374.44 1381.43 1364.60 
Standard 
Deviation  45.86 41.01 62.77 44.96 
 
Correlations 
Scores Math5 Read5  Math11  Read11 
Math5  1      
Read5  0.90 
N=21  1    
Math11  0.75 
N=21 
0.82 
N=21  1  





N=21  1 
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TABLE 3 
EFFECT ON HOUSE PRICES OF 5
TH AND 11
TH GRADE TEST SCORES 
(LOCAL SCHOOL LEVEL) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Ln(House Price) 
  Math 5  Read 5  Sum 5  Math 11  Read 11  Sum11 
SCHOOL TEST SCORES 
MATH5  0.0169       
  (0.0059)***       
READ5   0.0238      
   (0.0065)***      
SUM5    0.0209     
    (0.0062)***     
MATH11     0.0225    
     (0.0064)***    
READ11      0.0100   
      (0.0062)   
SUM11         0.0183 
       (0.0064)*** 
PROPERTY TAX RATES 
SDPTAX  -0.0134 -0.0129 -0.0131 -0.0126 -0.0138 -0.0132 
  (0.0019)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0019)*** 
MUNPTAX  -0.0113 -0.0117 -0.0119 -0.0105 -0.0091 -0.0104 
  (0.0062)* (0.0062)* (0.0062)* (0.0060)* (0.0061)  (0.0061)* 
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
ATTCHD  -0.1746 -0.1754 -0.1750 -0.1736 -0.1738 -0.1736 
  (0.0117)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0117)*** 
AGE  -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0028 
  (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** 
LTSIZE  0.0596 0.0598 0.0598 0.0574 0.0579 0.0575 
  (0.0252)** (0.0252)** (0.0252)** (0.0252)** (0.0253)** (0.0253)** 
LTSIZE  (squared)  -0.0096 -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0094 -0.0095 -0.0094 
  (0.0043)** (0.0043)** (0.0043)** (0.0043)** (0.0043)** (0.0043)** 
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  Math 5  Read 5  Sum 5  Math 11  Read 11  Sum11 
LVSQFT  0.0368 0.0368 0.0368 0.0367 0.0369 0.0368 
  (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)*** 
LVSQFT  (squared)  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
BDRM  0.0186 0.0187 0.0187 0.0184 0.0182 0.0183 
  (0.0094)** (0.0094)** (0.0094)** (0.0093)** (0.0094)*  (0.0094)* 
BATH  0.0465 0.0459 0.0463 0.0452 0.0458 0.0455 
  (0.0145)*** (0.0145)*** (0.0145)*** (0.0145)*** (0.0146)*** (0.0145)*** 
BSMT  0.1051 0.1045 0.1048 0.1019 0.1048 0.1033 
  (0.0153)*** (0.0153)*** (0.0153)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0154)*** (0.0153)*** 
AIR  0.0433 0.0429 0.0430 0.0437 0.0438 0.0436 
  (0.0125)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0125)*** 
FIREPL  0.0580 0.0576 0.0577 0.0606 0.0599 0.0605 
  (0.0104)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0103)*** 
GAR  0.1261 0.1249 0.1255 0.1257 0.1271 0.1264 
  (0.0118)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0118)*** 
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS 
CRIMERATE  -0.0149 -0.0138 -0.0140 -0.0134 -0.0165 -0.0143 
  (0.0033)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0034)*** 
65+  0.3995 0.4036 0.4034 0.3893 0.3836 0.3885 
  (0.0757)*** (0.0755)*** (0.0756)*** (0.0751)*** (0.0750)*** (0.0750)*** 
NONWT  -0.4016 -0.4012 -0.4010 -0.4225 -0.4109 -0.4178 
  (0.0490)*** (0.0488)*** (0.0489)*** (0.0496)*** (0.0492)*** (0.0495)*** 
OWN  0.5448 0.5552 0.5499 0.5118 0.5238 0.5140 
  (0.2030)*** (0.2032)*** (0.2030)*** (0.2031)**  (0.2042)**  (0.2034)** 
OWN  (squared)  -0.5332 -0.5441 -0.5385 -0.5099 -0.5186 -0.5122 
  (0.1442)*** (0.1443)*** (0.1441)*** (0.1441)*** (0.1448)*** (0.1443)*** 
GRAD  0.5493 0.5235 0.5377 0.5309 0.5469 0.5376 
  (0.0745)*** (0.0744)*** (0.0744)*** (0.0747)*** (0.0746)*** (0.0746)*** 
MED  INC  0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 
  (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** 
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  Math 5  Read 5  Sum 5  Math 11  Read 11  Sum11 
DISTCBD -0.0082  -0.0084  -0.0083 -0.0080 -0.0078 -0.0078 
  (0.0010)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0010)*** 
CONSTANT 10.8362 10.6515 10.7214 10.7447 10.9198 10.7535 
  (0.1632)*** (0.1838)*** (0.1770)*** (0.1653)*** (0.2102)*** (0.1892)*** 
        
Observations  3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 
R-squared  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: Dummies are included for those municipalities for which the crime rate is not available. 
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TABLE 4 
EFFECT ON HOUSE PRICES OF 5
TH AND 11
TH GRADE TEST SCORES 
(DISTRICT LEVEL) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Ln(House Price) 
  Math 5  Read 5  Sum 5  Math 11  Read11  Sum 11 
SCHOOL TEST SCORES 
MATH5_DIST  0.0199         
  (0.0050)***         
READ5_DIST    0.0308       
    (0.0051)***       
SUM5_DIST     0.0251       
     (0.0050)***       
MATH11_DIST       0.0212     
       (0.0062)***     
READ11_DIST        0.0116   
        (0.0062)*   
SUM11_DIST          0.0182 
          (0.0062)*** 
           
PROPERTY TAX 
RATES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
           
STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
           
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Observations  3150  3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 
R-squared  0.80  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 5 
COMPARISON OF EFFECTS ON HOUSE PRICES OF TEST SCORES ACROSS GRADES 
 
  SCHOOL LEVEL  DISTRICT LEVEL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  =  Ln(House Price) 
  Math Read Sum Math Read  Sum 
MATH5 0.0086           
 (0.0066)           
MATH11 0.0180           
 (0.0072)**           
READ5   0.0242         
   (0.0074)***         
READ11   -0.0008         
   (0.0069)         
SUM5       0.0158       
     (0.0074)**       
SUM11     0.0097       
     (0.0075)       
MATH5_DISTRICT       0.0151     
       (0.0075)**     
MATH11_DISTRICT       0.0080     
       (0.0092)     
READ5_DISTRICT         0.0456   
         (0.0070)***   
READ11_DISTRICT         -0.0244   
         (0.0085)***   
SUM5_DISTRICT           0.0344 
           (0.0082)*** 
SUM11_DISTRICT           -0.0141 
       (0.0103) 
            
  30 
PROPERTY TAX 
RATES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
            
STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
            
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
            
Observations  3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 
R-squared  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6 
Comparison of Effect on House Prices of 5
th Grade Scores 
at School Level and District Level 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Ln(House Price) 
  Math Reading Sum 
SCHOOL QUALITY MEASURES 
MATH5_SCHOOL -0.0019     
 (0.0090)     
MATH5_DISTRICT 0.0212     
 (0.0077)***     
READ5_ SCHOOL     -0.0032   
   (0.0093)   
READ5_DISTRICT   0.0327   
   (0.0073)***   
SUM5_ SCHOOL       -0.0029 
     (0.0094) 
SUM5_DISTRICT     0.0269 
     (0.0076)*** 
      
PROPERTY TAX 
RATES  YES YES  YES 
      
STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES  YES 
      
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES  YES 
      
Observations 3150  3150  3150 
R-squared 0.80  0.80  0.80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 7 
EFFECT OF CLASS SIZE ON HOUSE PRICES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Ln(House Price) 
  Math5 Read5 Sum5 Math11  Read11  Sum11 
SCHOOL TEST SCORES 
MATH5  0.0160       
  (0.0060)***       
READ5   0.0230      
   (0.0066)***      
SUM5   0.0201     
    (0.0064)***     
MATH11     0.0260    
     (0.0067)***    
READ11      0.0173   
      (0.0069)**   
SUM11       0.0239 
       (0.0069)*** 
CLASS SIZE 
ESCS24+ -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001       
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)       
HSCS24+       -0.0011  -0.0012  -0.0013 
       (0.0005)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0005)*** 
        
PROPERTY TAX 
RATES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations  3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 
R-squared  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 
Effect Of School District Expenditures On House Prices 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Ln(House Price) 
  Math5 Read5 Sum5 Math11  Read11  Sum11 
SCHOOL TEST SCORES 
MATH5_DIST  0.0474       
  (0.0068)***       
READ5_DIST   0.0416      
   (0.0058)***      
SUM5_DIST    0.0442     
    (0.0062)***     
MATH11_DIST     0.0324    
     (0.0074)***    
READ11_DIST      0.0324   
      (0.0083)***   
HSD_SUM_STD       0.0346 
       (0.0079)*** 
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES 
EXPUPIL  0.0050 0.0065 0.0059 0.0066 0.0030 0.0056 
  (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0066) 
        
PROPERTY TAX 
RATES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations  2846 2846 2846 2846 2846 2846 
R-squared  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 
Fifth Grade District Scores 
Full Sample with Neighborhood Variables and 
District Boundary Areas with Boundary Dummies 
  MATH READING  SUM 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  =  Ln(House Price) 

































MATH5_DIST  0.01994  0.01223  0.00448           
  (0.00500)***  (0.00961)  (0.00920)           
READ5_DIST       0.03078  0.01611  0.00750      
       (0.00513)***  (0.01131)  (0.01036)       
SUM5_DIST            0.02511  0.01408  0.00586 
            (0.00503)***  (0.01033)  (0.00973) 
                
PROPERTY TAX 
RATES  YES YES  YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES YES 
                
STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES  YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES YES 
                
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES NO  YES  YES NO  YES YES  NO  YES 
                
BOUNDARY 
DUMMIES  NO YES  NO  NO YES  NO  NO YES  NO 
                
Observations  3150 874 874  3150 874 874  3150 874 874 
R-squared 0.80  0.78  0.75  0.80  0.78 0.75  0.80  0.78 0.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 10 
Eleventh Grade District Scores 
Full Sample with Neighborhood Variables and 
District Boundary Areas with Boundary Dummies 
  MATH READING  SUM 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  =  Ln(House Price) 

































DISTRICT TEST SCORES 
MATH11_DIST  0.02117 0.02662  0.01251            
  (0.00616)***  (0.01451)*  (0.01050)          
READ11_DIST      0.01160  0.02777  0.00659      
      (0.00620)*  (0.01373)**  (0.01057)      
SUM11_DIST          0.01816  0.02853  0.01055 
          (0.00624)***  (0.01431)**  (0.01057) 
              
PROPERTY TAX 
RATES  YES YES YES  YES  YES YES  YES YES YES 
               
STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES YES YES  YES  YES YES  YES YES YES 
               
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS  YES NO YES  YES  NO  YES YES  NO  YES 
              
BOUNDARY 
DUMMIES  NO  YES  NO  NO YES NO  NO YES NO 
              
Observations  3150  874  874  3150  874 874  3150  874 874 
R-squared 0.80  0.78  0.75  0.80 0.78 0.75  0.80 0.78 0.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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